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Chapter 4 
Positionalities, intersectionalities and transnational feminism in researching women in post-
invasion Iraq 
Nadje Al-­‐Ali and Nicola Pratt 
 
	  
The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has presented a ‘gender paradox’ in international politics. 
On the one hand, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush claimed that one of 
the objectives of the invasion was to ‘liberate Iraqi women’, and the first parliamentary 
elections following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime did result in women winning 30 per 
cent of seats. On the other hand, as we found in our work (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009), the situation 
of women in Iraq since the invasion has deteriorated on various levels: socio-economic, 
political, legal and educational. This chapter examines why military intervention to unseat a 
brutal dictatorship has not led to an improvement in women’s rights or in women’s situation 
in general. In addition, we reflect upon the process of conducting feminist research on women 
in Iraq, including our respective positionalities and our methodological approach, rooted in 
transnational feminist politics. 
 
The Puzzle: Can military intervention liberate women? 
The original impetus for our research came from our involvement in the U.K. anti-war 
movements against the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine, as well as our participation in U.K. branches of transnational women’s peace 
movements. The process of constructing transnational solidarity with people living under 
occupation, whilst ensuring that such solidarity is supportive of women, who are often 
particularly disadvantaged by conflict, is an exercise in applying our commitment to 
transnational feminism.  
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Much has been written to explain the disastrous outcomes of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003, ranging from ill-conceived policies to ineffective implementation of policies (e.g., 
Diamond, 2005; Dodge, 2005; Phillips, 2005; Hashim, 2006; Herring & Rangwala, 2006). 
Yet, until our study (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009), not a single author had paid serious scholarly 
attention to the gendered impacts of the war on Iraq1 -- despite the fact that the U.S. 
administration cited the liberation of Iraqi women as one of the goals of the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. Our research, conducted between 2003 and 2008, focused on 
understanding the consequences of the 2003 invasion for women in Iraq and identifying 
women’s responses to the situation. 
 
The resort to military intervention to ‘liberate women,’ as well as men who are suffering 
under repressive dictatorships, is a seductive idea because it promises success where other 
means have failed. In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein withstood over a decade of crippling 
sanctions, defied UN resolutions, survived assassination attempts and brutally suppressed an 
internal uprising in 1991. ‘Liberal interventionists’ have argued that it is the obligation of 
humanity to protect human rights and human lives, irrespective of borders (Arend & Beck, 
1993, p.133). Our research examined the reasons why military intervention and occupation 
failed to liberate Iraqi women and how, instead, they produced a deterioration in women’s 
circumstances and position (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009). 
 
Background  
On 20 March 2003, in the face of significant opposition, the U.S., principally supported by 
the U.K., launched a military attack on Iraq to remove weapons of mass destruction it 
allegedly possessed. Since then, the evidence for these claims has been discredited. In 
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addition to claims about weapons of mass destruction and threats to international security, US 
administration officials spoke publicly of the plight of women under Saddam Hussein, 
including rapes, abductions, torture and other horrors.2 Whilst undoubtedly many Iraqi 
women (and men) suffered human rights abuses and gender-specific violence under Saddam 
Hussein, women’s situation was more nuanced. Under the Ba’ath regime and previous Iraqi 
regimes, Iraqi women were encouraged to enter education, including higher education, and 
the workforce. Women were part of political parties and movements as well as more specific 
women’s rights organizations, from the founding of Iraq onwards. The Iraqi Women’s 
League had over 40,000 members across Iraq and was instrumental in shaping Iraq’s 
constitution of 1959. In addition, laws governing marriage, divorce, child custody and 
inheritance (otherwise known as personal status issues) afforded women significantly more 
rights than their counterparts in other Middle East countries, largely due to the influence of 
the Iraqi Women’s League (Al-Ali, 2007).3 From the 1960s, it was not unusual for women to 
work in a range of professions, such as doctors, engineers, and lawyers. Women benefitted 
from free access to health care and child care provided by the state. However, women’s rights 
started to shrink considerably during the 13 years of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq 
after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Due to the shrinking economy, large-scale 
unemployment and humanitarian crisis, which unfolded throughout this period, the state’s 
previous policies of inclusion shifted towards more conservative gender norms. At the same 
time, demographic factors and poverty led to an increase in polygamy, prostitution and 
trafficking of women (Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Jawaheri 2008). 
 
The long history of Iraqi women’s mobilization was ignored by American and British 
politicians. Instead, the representation of women’s victimization under Saddam Hussein 
constituted an explicit justification for military intervention in Iraq. The invasion was 
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represented as investing Iraqi women with agency, transforming them from ‘victims’ to 
‘heroines’. At a press conference two weeks before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, flanked by 
four ‘Women for a Free Iraq,’4 Paula Dobriansky, then undersecretary of state for global 
affairs, declared:  ‘We are at a critical point in dealing with Saddam Hussein. However this 
turns out, it is clear that the women of Iraq have a critical role to play in the future revival of 
their society.’  
 
The regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled on 20 April 2003 and by 1 May 2003 U.S. 
President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations. ‘Women’s 
empowerment’, as the US administration called it, was seen as a pillar of ‘democratization’ 
and ‘peace-building’ in supposedly ‘post-conflict’ Iraq. For the Bush administration, Iraqi 
women would be ‘helping give birth to freedom’ in the post-Saddam order (Wolfowitz, 
2004). In the post-invasion period, the image of the heroic Iraqi woman appeared with 
regularity in the US and international media (for example, holding a purple-coloured finger 
during the coverage of the first elections) to embody the U.S. administration’s attempts to 
build a new Iraq. In the 2005 State of the Union Address, Safia al-Suhail, an Iraqi woman 
activist, stood in the gallery with Laura Bush as the president honoured her as one of Iraq’s 
‘leading democracy and human rights advocates.’5 For supporters of the administration, Safia 
al-Suhail represented ‘the courage and determination of Middle Easterners, and in particular 
Middle Eastern women, to build free and just societies’ (Gordan 2005). Through channels 
such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, millions of dollars were allocated to projects 
targeting women not only as a humanitarian or developmental concern but also a ‘U.S. 
foreign policy imperative’ (Dobriansky, 2005). The then U.S. Secretary of State appointed a 
‘senior advisor for women’s empowerment’ (US Department of State, 2006) and George W. 
Bush stated: ‘There’s no doubt in my mind, empowering women in new democracies will 
5 
 
make those democracies better countries and help lay the foundation of peace for generations 
to come’ (USINFO, 2006). Yet, as our research on Iraq shows, there was a huge gap between 
this rhetorical support for women’s involvement in reconstruction and the actual outcomes 
for women in Iraq. 
 
Our approach  
Our research was mainly based on interviews with three groups of people: Iraqi women 
activists, either living inside Iraq and/or in the diaspora; US and UK government officials 
supporting women’s empowerment in Iraq; and those working in international NGOs and 
other agencies in the field of gender and development/women’s empowerment. For the most 
part, Nadje interviewed Iraqi women activists and Nicola interviewed government officials 
and internationals.  
 
Our approach to interviews as a method was grounded in a feminist approach to social 
science. Rather than aiming to produce ‘objective knowledge’, we recognise that our 
identities, values and attitudes shape the research process throughout, including the types of 
questions asked, the nature of interactions with interviewees and the interpretation of data. 
We reflect upon our positionality in order to produce ‘feminist’ or ‘strong objectivity’ 
(Haraway 1988; Harding 1993). In undertaking research for our book on women in Iraq, in a 
context of Western invasion and occupation and increasing ethno-religious sectarianism 
inside Iraq, our respective positionalities with regard to perceived national, cultural/religious 
belonging as well as attitudes towards the 2003 invasion undoubtedly shaped the research 
process.  
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Nicola’s positionality: 
As a UK citizen, my opposition to the UK government’s involvement in the Iraq war 
constitutes an ethical standpoint that has informed my engagement throughout the research 
process (Hesse-Bibar 2007: 17). This created particular challenges for me in interviewing 
individuals who could be viewed as contributing, in one way or another, to the war effort and 
the apparatus of occupation. Whilst feminist scholars have written extensively about the 
interview process, this has usually been in cases where the researcher empathizes with her 
interviewee or seeks to mitigate possible exploitative power relations resulting from the 
researcher’s position vis-à-vis the interviewee. Relatively little has been written about 
feminist perspectives on ‘studying up’: that is, the process of interviewing elites.  
 
Despite my opposition to my own government and to the notion of social science as 
‘objective’, perhaps paradoxically, my perceived identity as a British citizen and academic 
researcher undoubtedly facilitated my access to government officials and other internationals. 
In particular, by adopting the commonly-expected role of an academic engaged in 
independent and objective ‘truth-seeking’, I was able to establish a ‘positional space’ 
(Mullings 1999) from where I could conduct my interviews. However, simultaneously, some 
have regarded my British citizenship and academic profession as undermining my authority 
to research or write about women in Iraq. Whilst I strongly resist any idea of ‘speaking on 
behalf of’ Iraqi women, conversely, I also find problematic the notion that only Iraqi women 
can research or write about women in Iraq, particularly in light of the diversity of Iraqi 
women and their experiences (as we discuss later in the chapter).  
 
I found the above-outlined attitudes towards me as a British researcher (whether positive or 
negative) troubling. Seeing myself as someone who seeks to transgress borders, I was 
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concerned that other people attempted to locate me firmly within certain borders and, 
moreover, to ascribe certain authority to me as a result of that position. However, reflecting 
upon this research experience and my positionality vis-à-vis my interviewees is a necessary 
part of understanding interviews as producing ‘situated knowledges’ that are partial, 
relational and subjective (Haraway 1988). In other words, reflecting upon the researcher’s 
positionality is not a means of improving the accuracy of our research results but rather a 
means of improving the accuracy of the claims that we wish to make about the results of our 
research.  
 
Nadje’s positionality 
Over the past two decades, I have ‘become Iraqi’. This has been both an ascribed identity—
how many people see and present me—and how I started to identify myself emotionally and 
politically. My academic focus on Iraqi women and gender relations has paralleled both my 
political activism vis-a-vis Iraq and my personal and emotional links to the place where much 
of my father’s family still lives. Most of the time, my Iraqi ‘origins’ have opened up doors in 
the context of fieldwork amongst Iraqi women in the diaspora and have also increased my 
credibility and expert status in ‘the West’. Despite this, I have frequently felt uncomfortable 
with the way the term ‘Iraqi’ is ascribed to me by the Western media, academia and Iraqi 
women alike, as there appears to be something very essentialising and simplistic about 
attaching this label. Given that I have visited Iraq on numerous occasions but never actually 
lived there, grew up in Germany, speak only broken Arabic (and more Egyptian than Iraqi), 
and received my education in Germany, the U.S., Egypt and the U.K., I feel that I am 
positioned in much more complex ways than simply being ‘the Iraqi anthropologist’. On the 
other hand, I have experienced a shift in my sense of self and belonging, of ‘feeling Iraqi’, 
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less because of my father’s birth country and ‘my blood’ and more because of the political 
developments inside Iraq and my political and emotional involvement in them. 
 
There have also been situations and encounters where, similar to Nicola’s experiences, my 
views, analyses and assessments have been discredited by Iraqi women and men on the basis 
of my Western and feminist backgrounds. Being called a ‘Western feminist’ is generally 
equated with ethnocentric, radical feminist thought that is divorced from empirical realities in 
the region and often ignorant about cultural sensitivities and taboos. While I can easily point 
to the diversity of feminist positions both inside the West and the Middle East, it is very hard 
to argue against opinions which are based on ‘I lived it and you have not’, thereby 
discrediting any view that is perceived not to be ‘authentic’ and ‘experiential’. Although 
intellectually I find such a position problematic, emotionally I feel humbled by people’s 
personal experiences inside Iraq and acknowledge that there are dimensions of ‘truth’ and 
experience that cannot be grasped if not lived personally. 
 
A few years ago I reflected on my positionality in the context of doing research amongst 
secular Egyptian women activists in Cairo. At the time, I was comparing my experiences to 
those of an Egyptian scholar, Dr Heba El-Kholy, who as a native Egyptian of upper middle 
class background was doing research in Cairo amongst women of lower income background. 
We both felt that social class background was much more significant than nationality in 
shaping our respective relations with the women we interviewed. Social class has also been 
significant amongst the Iraqi women I have been interviewing. However, due to increasing 
sectarianism, ‘being of middle class and Iraqi background’ has not been a sufficient marker 
of identity for many of my respondents, who were particularly interested in my specific 
ethnic and religious background.  
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Another set of tensions in terms of my positionality have revolved around my dual roles as 
researcher and activist. I am a founding member of a London-based women’s organization 
called ‘Act Together: Women’s Action on Iraq’. The group, consisting of Iraqi, British and 
other international women activists, has aimed to raise awareness about the impact of 
economic sanctions, dictatorship, wars, and occupation on women and gender relations. 
Although I do not believe in the notion of the neutral, objective researcher who conceals his 
or her political views and values, like Nicola, I sometimes find it difficult to engage with 
women in my research whose political views I find extremely problematic.  
 
Rather than seeing our respective positionalities as an obstacle to be overcome, we have 
viewed it as a resource. Reflecting upon our positions in relation to different power relations 
obliges us to identify the different political interests that are invested by actors in relation to 
our research area. In practice, awareness and reflexivity in the research process obliges us to 
engage with our respondents, especially Iraqi women activists, beyond a pre-determined set 
of questions. In the context of talking to Iraqi women’s rights activists, it was quite apparent 
to Nadje that a one-off interview would not be sufficient to establish the kind of rapport and 
trust needed to break through the initial responses based on collective identity politics which 
were often articulated as a result of ascribing a specific identity to Nadje as a researcher. 
Only multiple encounters with a mutual exchange of views helped respondents to speak more 
freely and at ease.  
 
Informed by transnational feminist politics, we were also seeking to go beyond the binaries 
present in much literature on gender, violence and war.  We tried to apply an ‘intersectional 
analysis’, recognizing that women’s oppression and struggles are constituted by a wide array 
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of structural inequalities linked to gender, race, class, sexual orientation, as well as 
nationality. As black, post-colonial and post-structuralist feminists have argued, ‘woman’ and 
‘gender’ do not represent some ‘essence’ that is shared amongst women across time and 
space (e.g., Carby, 1982; Mohanty, 1988; Butler, 1999). Indeed, categories such as ‘gender’, 
‘sexuality’, ‘class’, ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nationality’ are always constructed, reproduced and 
resisted through intersections with one another. Such an understanding of women’s identities 
and positions lead us to consider women’s experiences of war as not only a result of their 
gender but also their nationality, class and other axes of social difference (such as ethnicity 
and/or religion) that may become significant in the course of conflict. The intersectionality of 
identities and its challenge to the unitary category of ‘woman’ presents particular challenges 
to feminist solidarity—whether within or across national boundaries. In this respect, our 
approach is based on transnational feminism.  
 
‘Transnational feminism’ should be differentiated from ‘international feminism’. 
International feminism has existed for a long time and links were established among 
women’s movements in various countries in the early part of the twentieth century 
(Moghadam, 2005). Examples are the International Women’s Council, the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom, Women’s International Democratic Federation, 
and International Federation of Business and Professional Women (Moghadam, 2005). 
However, transnational feminism entails going beyond the false universalism of those 
Western feminisms that have dominated international feminist movements to consider the 
particular experiences of those women on the margins of the global political economy, 
‘allow[ing] for a more concrete and expansive vision of universal justice’ (Mohanty, 2002, 
p.510). In the context of war and conflict, a transnational rather than an international 
approach operates ‘to destabilize the centrality of the nation-state as the principal unit of 
11 
 
inquiry into relations of conflict and to highlight dimensions of power that traverse an array 
of borders, including political boundaries, cultural or national identity markers, and class 
fractions’ (Giles & Hyndman, 2004, pp.313-14). In the context of Iraq, we need to be 
attendant to the transnational power imbalances between the U.S., as the world’s only 
superpower and largest military, and the Iraqi actors battling against the U.S. and how 
gender, race, and sexuality are implicated in those relations. In particular, the U.S. 
administration’s military intervention in Iraq to liberate Iraqi women recalls the claims of 
past colonizers, who justified colonialism as ‘white men saving brown women from brown 
men’ (Spivak, 1988, p. 93).  
 
In the context of our work, we employed our transnational and intersectional analysis to 
understand women’s experiences in post-invasion Iraq. In practice, this meant that we did not 
assume that Iraqi women exist in the singular, with a united voice. Nor did we privilege one 
experience over another. In our conversations with Iraqi activists, we tried to be sensitive to 
the multiple intersecting configurations of power impacting and shaping women’s 
experiences of the previous regime, the invasion and the occupation. We avoided reducing 
women’s diverse experiences to religious or ethnic identities and considered other significant 
markers of difference such as class and political affiliation as also if not sometimes more 
significant. Below we share some of our findings, focusing on two particular aspects: 
women’s political participation and the increase in gender-based violence.  
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Our Findings 
Gender-based violence and the ‘continuum of violence’ 
Instead of thinking about warfare as an isolated instance of violence, feminist scholars and 
activists have alerted us to the ‘continuum of violence’ between war and peace, prewar and 
postwar: 
[…] Gender is manifest in the violence that flows through all of them 
and in the peace processes that may be present at all moments too. To 
consider one moment in this flux in the absence of the next is arbitrary 
(Cockburn, 2004, p.43).  
Undeniably, the biggest challenge facing Iraqi women after the 2003 invasion is the lack of 
security coupled with the lack of rule of law, both contributing to increasing and wide-
ranging forms of gender-based violence. High levels of domestic violence, verbal and 
physical intimidation on the street, sexual harassment, rape, forced marriage (as well as 
increases in mu’tah or so-called pleasure marriages), trafficking, forced prostitution, female 
genital mutilation, and honour-based crimes,6 including killings, have been very much part of 
the post-invasion experience of Iraqi women (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2011).7 
 
According to some analysts, all such violence should be situated within a ‘sexual violence 
approach’ (Jacobs, Jacobson et al., 2000, p.2) even where no overtly sexual act is involved. In 
this interpretation, a wide spectrum of violent acts is subsumed under a broad definition of 
male sexual violence rooted in masculinity, including ‘Violence which takes place in the 
home or the workplace and on the street corner; violence involving racism, homophobia, 
xenophobia and other prejudices; violence on international and global levels including 
trafficking in women and women’s experiences of war violence’ (Corrin, 1996, p.1). 
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However, this approach essentialises men and masculinities as well as women and 
femininities, whilst glossing over the multiple causes of violence, which are not simply 
rooted in male sexuality. Iraqi men are not perpetrators of various forms of political, ethnic 
and domestic violence because of their sexual drives or frustrations and testosterone levels. 
Nor are they culturally hard-wired to be violent, as many Islamophobic and racist 
commentators may like us to believe. In the midst of war and ‘post-war’ situations, violence 
against women may become endemic partly due to the weakness of institutions of law, order 
and, justice, but also as an element of heightened aggression and militarization, and 
prevailing constructions of masculinity promoted during conflict. Iraq is an example, par 
excellence, for the increase in violence on all levels as a result of the ongoing occupations 
and militarization of societies, lawlessness, and significant role played by local and national 
militias. 
 
In addition, our research found that gender-based violence was linked to the 
instrumentalisation of women’s issues by the U.S. occupation authorities and to the resulting 
wider politicisation of gender amongst different actors inside Iraq since the U.S. invasion. 
Islamist political parties, militia and insurgents as well as secular constituencies have all used 
women to gain symbolic capital and underpin their political authority in relation to their 
political rivals. Islamist political parties constructed women as symbols to demarcate a 
radical break with the previous Ba‘ath regime, which was nominally secular and engaged in 
limited forms of state feminism during the 1970s and early 1980s. Simultaneously, Islamist 
militia and insurgents perceived women as symbols of resistance not only to the U.S. 
occupation authorities but to Western imperialism more generally. As a result, these groups 
promoted conservative gender norms in relation to women’s behaviour and dress code. 
Consequently, women have found it increasingly difficult to go out in public without a male 
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relative or without wearing the veil, which was not the case for Iraqi women prior to the 
invasion, particularly in urban areas. The physical violence against women, particularly those 
of religious minorities, has intensified in areas captured by the so-called Islamic State after 
the summer of 2014 (Al-Ali, 2014a). Moreover, the Islamist parties that controlled the 
legislature following the invasion have undermined the previous Personal Status Code (or 
family laws) by subordinating issues of marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance to 
religious authorities, opening the way for more conservative interpretations of women’s 
rights in these matters.  
 
This is not to deny the continuum of violence—that is, the relationships between forms of 
violence within the home, on the street and within society at large, and the violence occurring 
during pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations (Cockburn, 2004). But it is important 
to recognize the complex causes of violence, which, whilst gendered, cannot be reduced to 
gender. Women are not always victims and men are not always perpetrators of violence, 
rather men and women can both be active agents in perpetrating and resisting violence 
(Lentin, 1997; Moser & Clark, 2001). As our research demonstrates, Iraqi women in the 
diaspora played an important role in lobbying for U.S. military action against Iraq, whilst 
some women inside Iraq have supported political parties implicated in sectarian violence as 
well as armed groups fighting U.S. occupation forces (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009). Conversely, 
men can also be victims of gender-specific violence during wartime, where sexual violence is 
used to undermine the ‘enemy’s’ masculinity and morale. In Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, 
sexualized torture was perpetrated by U.S. female soldiers against Iraqi prisoners based on 
racist assumptions that Muslim men would suffer more shame because of their assumed 
hostility to gender equality (Nusair, 2008).  
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Women and Political Participation 
Contrary to policy and mainstream media accounts, Iraqi women have very limited political 
influence and power to contribute to decision-making in post-invasion Iraq, and this situation 
has worsened over time. While there were six female-headed ministries from 2005-2006, no 
woman has been appointed to a senior post in the new 44-member cabinet since  elections in  
2010. During the last years of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, only two ministries of 
state were offered to women: one was without portfolio and she lost her position as part of a 
previous downsizing of government in 2011 (in an attempt to placate protests against 
ineffective government), leaving only one female minister, Ibtihal al-Zaidi, who was 
appointed Minister of State for Women’s Affairs. She herself stated that her Ministry:  ‘has 
no jurisdiction over the directorate of women’s welfare or increasing funds allocated to 
widows.’ In fact, she argued ‘the Ministry is no more than an executive-consultation bureau 
with a limited budget and no jurisdiction on implementing resolutions or activities’. Her 
predecessor, Nawal al-Samaraie, resigned due to lack of jurisdiction and insufficient budget.8 
In addition, women have rarely been involved in important political negotiations leading up 
to and since the ousting of Saddam Hussein. 
 
Partly, this is a direct consequence of the re-emergence of political authoritarianism under 
former Prime Minister al-Maliki since 2006, in which all political actors have experienced 
systematic side-lining. In turn, there has continued to be a lack of rule of law, widespread 
political violence and rampant corruption, which have a negative impact upon politics. 
However, women are particularly marginalized in a context where security and military 
measures continue to be prioritized as solutions to ongoing political violence and social 
attitudes have shifted towards more conservative gender norms (as discussed above), with 
women being perceived as incapable of leading or strategizing, or as vulnerable to political 
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intimidation and violence (Pratt, 2011).  
 
A women’s quota of 25 percent exists for the legislature, which translated into 82 women 
elected to parliament out of a total of 325 seats in the 2010 elections. Unfortunately, this has 
not necessarily translated into a greater voice for Iraqi women. What has clearly emerged 
from our intersectional feminist lens is the fact that Iraqi women exist in the plural: they are 
differentiated not merely by ethnic and religious background as is frequently mentioned 
today, but they are diverse in terms of social class, place of residence (urban versus rural), 
political orientation, specific experiences of the past regime and attitudes towards religion 
and the US occupation. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, ethnic and religious backgrounds 
have played an increasing role in political and social life to the extent that sectarian divisions 
have started to cut across previously unifying variables, such as class or a specific urban 
identity. Simultaneously, secular versus Islamist political positions cut across Sunni and Shia 
backgrounds and currently shape political struggles amongst Iraqi women activists involved 
in the political process inside Iraq.  
 
Most of the women parliamentarians are the wives, sisters or daughters of male politicians 
eager to fill the allocated seats with women without having to engage with wider issues of 
gender equality and women’s rights. Indeed, many Iraqi women’s rights activists with whom 
we have spoken over the last years bemoan the phenomenon of female parliamentarians 
being often more interested in expressing partisan views – frequently Islamist and sectarian – 
instead of furthering the interests of all Iraqi women (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2008a).  
 
Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi (appointed in 2014 to replace the unpopular Maliki) tried to 
reform the existing corrupt and authoritarian political system, largely due to pressure from the 
17 
 
Iraqi population as evidenced in large-scale protests all over the country in the summer of 
2015.  A boost to women’s political representation was the appointment of Baghdad’s first 
female mayor Dr Thikra Alwash in February 2015. Yet, women have continued to be side-
lined in both parliament and government with only one female minister, Dr Adila Mahmoud 
Hussein, appointed as Minister of Health. 
 
The situation in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is slightly different for female 
parliamentarians and politicians, given that they have played a more active role in shaping 
legislation and policy, partly as a result of the KRG leadership wishing to appear more 
progressive to its Western allies and also because of Kurdish women’s history of 
participation in the Kurdish nationalist struggle (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2011). Many Kurdish 
women’s rights activists, however, have also complained about tokenism and lack of proper 
consultation, in addition to the small number of women in decision-making positions (Al-Ali 
& Pratt 2011). 
 
Looking at Western media representations, speeches by Western politicians and policy 
documents, we found that dominant discourses9 about Iraqi women tend to hide the 
complexity of their social backgrounds and political positions. Their experiences are 
selectively collected and represented in order to provide particular categories of women. 
Specifically, women in Iraq are reduced to either victims or heroines, as we briefly 
highlighted above (see also, Al-Ali & Pratt, 2008b).  
 
Despite the systematic marginalization and side-lining of Iraqi women in official political 
institutions and processes, women have not merely stood by but have mobilised at the level of 
formal civil society organizations, social and political movements, as well as more informal 
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community and interest groups. Women activists have been at the forefront of a growing 
political movement for democracy and human rights that, in line with wider political 
movements and processes in the region since the end of 2010, are asking for greater 
transparency and an end to corruption and political authoritarianism (Al-Ali 2013).  
 
Women have participated in the protests in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and in the Kurdish 
region, particularly in Sulimaniya. In June 2011, a group of women demonstrating for peace 
and democracy were physically attacked, including sexually, in Tahrir Square. For many 
months, groups of students and activists had been gathering in that square, demanding 
government reforms, jobs, more electricity, and clean water. Protesters were brutally beaten 
by the police and arrested; some disappeared and some organizers were killed, in what many 
activists allege are targeted assassinations ordered by former Prime Minister al-Maliki. At a 
human rights conference attended by international organizations in June 2011, one of the 
leading women’s rights activists, Hanaa Edwar, stormed in with a placard to protest against 
the disappearance of four activists who had been demonstrating publicly against the 
government. She was also challenging al-Maliki’s allegation that some Iraqi human rights 
organizations were fronts for terrorists.10  
 
More specific mobilization around women’s rights has also mushroomed over the past 
decade, despite the many challenges and threats to women’s rights activists. Women-led 
NGOs, as well as more informal community associations, have been campaigning against 
Article 41 of the 2005 constitution, which undermined the previously existing Personal Status 
Code, that is, the set of laws governing marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance, as 
well as against the penal code that does not offer sufficient protection against gender-based 
violence, particularly ‘honour-based crimes’. Women’s rights activists have also been 
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mobilizing against domestic violence, trafficking, and honour-based crimes, providing 
shelters and advice to victims. Given the humanitarian situation, most organizations are also 
involved in welfare and charity work, providing income-generating activities as well as 
training for women.  
 
Iraqi women have been able to build on a long history of women’s rights activism since the 
turn of the 20th century as well as many years of political mobilization in opposition 
movements against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Many Iraqi women’s rights activists 
realize that their struggle for greater gender equality and social justice cannot be separated 
from the struggle against an emerging new dictatorship, the re-militarization of society, 
corruption, and nepotism. Very few activists, however, make a link between increased 
privatisation and neo-liberal economic policies on the one hand, and the increase in women’s 
unemployment and the feminisation of poverty on the other hand. Only those linked to leftist 
political parties articulate a critique of women’s empowerment as promoted by many donor 
agencies, especially those linked to the U.S., such as USAID. There seems to be a widespread 
acceptance amongst women activists of a liberal rights approach, in which legal rights, 
women’s leadership training and economic entrepreneurship, are seen as the pathways to 
Iraqi women’s empowerment.  
 
Reflecting on our work 
As transnational feminists, we recognize the impact of dominant discourses—in academic 
and policy-making circles—about Iraq and about women in Iraq as reflections of existing 
intersecting power structures. These power structures operate at different levels and reflect 
relations between men and women, different ethnic, religious and tribal groups, social 
classes, and the Iraqi government, Iraqi society, and the occupying forces. In our wider 
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research on Iraq, we have examined several of these dominant discourses, which neglect the 
social, cultural and economic complexity of Iraq, thereby ignoring, generalising, 
essentialising or instrumentalising women. If we are to avoid creating knowledge that 
reproduces these power structures, then we must find alternative ways of talking about 
women in Iraq that goes beyond simplistic binary categories of ‘victims’ versus ‘heroines’, 
recognizing that Iraqi women are vulnerable to gender-based violence and discrimination but 
that they are also active in mobilizing and campaigning against such injustices, as well as the 
reality that many Iraqi women may identify according to their religious and/or political 
affiliation before their gender. Given the destruction and violence provoked by current 
dominant discourses and practices, including neo-colonialism, Islamism and sectarianism, it 
is not only methodologically important, but also politically crucial, that we challenge them. 
 
Pointing to the long history of Iraqi women’s rights activism and the wider context of 
women’s and feminist movements in the Middle East and other predominantly Muslim 
societies challenges the idea that women’s rights – or human rights for that matter - belong to 
western civilizations. In the Iraqi context, just as in so many other places, historically, the 
argument that women’s rights belong to “the West” is put forward by those actors seeking to 
resist Western encroachment. Yet, Iraqi women’s rights activists are not merely mimicking  
‘Western agendas’ but are responding to issues relevant to women within a specific national 
and local context. As many non-western feminists have argued, women’s rights activism and 
feminism have been part of the national political landscape of many formerly colonized 
countries as well as those experiencing neo-colonial ventures today (Nayaran 1997). Cultural 
contexts are internally contested and women’s rights activists all over the world challenge 
patriarchal and authoritarian interpretations of what a specific culture should be. This is also 
evident in the Iraqi context where contestations over Iraqi and/or Muslim culture is an 
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element of the wider struggle over power, control and resources, complicated and intensified 
by US involvement. Conservative Islamist and tribal leaders are engaged in often violent 
contestations about resources and control which are regularly fought in the name of religion, 
culture and traditions. Control of women’s bodies, gender norms, and relationships between 
men and women become core to these struggles.  
 
Many people would argue that we cannot understand the processes and developments inside 
Iraq without paying attention to neo-liberal agendas and globalising capitalism, neo-
conservative notions of empire building and the so-called War on Terror. Many people also 
recognise the logic of the arms industry, which creates a perpetual demand for war and armed 
conflict. Inspired by the works of feminist scholars like Cynthia Cockburn (2010) and 
Cynthia Enloe (2004), we argue that gender ideologies and gender relations are part of the 
bigger picture of war and violence. As Cynthia Cockburn argues: ‘[G]ender relations are right 
there alongside class relations and ethno-national relations, intersecting with them, 
complicating them, sometimes even prevailing over them, in the origins, development and 
perpetuation of war’ (2010, pp. 231-232). Throughout our wider work, we have shown not 
only how the construction of particular types of gender identities and relations are central to 
war and violence in Iraq, but also how particular gender identities and relations are 
constructed in intersection with other axes of difference and inequality, which are a result of 
geopolitical competition in post-invasion Iraq.  
 
Any analysis of what went wrong in Iraq must put gender firmly on the agenda, from 
challenging the very premise that military intervention will lead to women’s liberation to 
exploring the various ways war, violence, occupation, armed resistance, humanitarian crisis 
and poverty affect men and women. A gendered analysis subverts state-centered notions of 
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security, which mostly disregard human rights and human welfare, and focuses our attention 
on the security of individual men, women and their families. It demonstrates how the security 
concerns of one state (the US, in the wake of 9/11) can create unimagined insecurities for 
ordinary people of another state (whether Iraq or Afghanistan). It also shows how these 
insecurities can fuel gender and other social inequalities, with devastating consequences for 
society.  
 
Given the level of violence and lack of security, the cessation of armed conflict must be a 
priority and a first step for establishing a more lasting peace. However, the cessation of 
armed conflict does not in and of itself signify peace. Cynthia Enloe (1988) famously stated 
over two decades ago that peace for women requires more than the cessation of armed 
conflict; there must also be an end to gender-based violence and freedom for women, 
including freedom to participate in all levels of decision-making.  
 
A gendering of peace and post-conflict reconstruction does not merely focus on women’s 
legal rights or counting the number of women in parliament. Our intersectional and 
transnational feminist approach diverges from an imperialist feminist, or even a liberal 
feminist, approach by paying close attention to the intersecting structures of power and 
inequalities and our own involvement in them. In the Iraqi context, this has meant paying 
attention to the impact of neo-colonial and imperialist policies; exploring the significance of 
neo-liberal economics, particularly privatisation and the role of multi-national companies; 
analysing the ways in which sectarian and communal differences intersect with gender to 
produce particular consequences for women; and finally looking carefully at the newly 
emerging political authoritarianism and militarism in Iraq. Given our findings on Iraq, real 
peace cannot be achieved without an end to the global and local inequalities that are linked to 
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imperialism, neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and militarism. A legalistic focus on rights or 
gender quotas, as happened under the U.S. occupation of Iraq, allows politicians to give lip 
service to ‘women’s rights’, whilst ignoring whether such measures lead to tangible 
improvements for women on the ground.  
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